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Tax Planning, Corporate Governance and Equity Value 
 
Abstract: Tax planning by firms is a highly significant activity. After audit fees, tax related 
services are the largest source of fee income for UK accounting firms. When viewed in terms 
of its impact, tax planning is the major source of the corporation tax gap amongst large firms 
(HMRC, 2010). Although traditionally tax planning has been viewed as benefiting 
shareholders via increased after tax earnings, more recently the underlying motivation has 
been questioned. Desai and Dharmapala (2006) argue that when an information asymmetry 
exists between managers and shareholders with respect to tax planning, it can facilitate 
managers acting in their own interests resulting in a negative association between tax 
planning and firm value. Using a sample of UK quoted firms from 2005-2007 and data drawn 
from International Accounting Standard 12 Income Taxes (IASB, 2010) Effective Tax Rate 
(ETR) reconciliations, this paper reports such a negative relationship. Further, the 
relationship is robust to the inclusion of corporate governance measures which could be 
expected to moderate the potential implications of a tax related shareholder-manager 
information asymmetry. An innovation of this paper is in using the ETR reconciliations to 
examine sub-categories of tax planning activities. The paper contributes to the debate of who 
determines, and benefits from tax planning conducted by firms. Its findings have direct policy 
relevance for shareholders and tax administrations in monitoring and controlling firms’ tax 
planning activities. 
 
Keywords: Tax planning, tax avoidance, firm value, corporate governance, agency costs 
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1. Introduction  
 
Fees for tax services are the most significant source of fee income for UK accounting firms 
after audit fees (Accountancy, 2007). Typically, such fees amount to 24 per cent of total fee 
income received by the UK’s 60 largest accounting firms (Accountancy, 2007). Whilst some 
of the advice relates to routine compliance matters it is reasonable to speculate that advice on 
tax planning comprises a significant element of the fee income. Reliable estimates of the 
scale of tax planning are notoriously difficult to make primarily due to lack of agreement on 
definitional and related measurement issues (National Audit Office, 2007). Recently HM 
Revenue and Customs (HMRC) has published estimates of the “tax gap” i.e. the difference 
between the theoretical liability and the amount collected. The latest available estimates are 
for 2008-09 (HMRC, 2010) and show a corporation tax gap of £6.9 billion, equivalent to 
13.9% of the theoretical liability. For the largest corporate groups administered by its Large 
Business Service (LBS), HMRC (2010) disaggregates the corporation tax gap into “tax 
avoidance issues” and “technical issues”.1 In the three year sample frame examined in this 
paper HMRC (2010) estimates that tax avoidance contributes 77.4%, 87.5% and 92.9% of the 
estimated LBS corporate tax gap of £3.1 billion (2004-05), £3.2 billion (2005-06) and £2.8 
billion (2006-07) respectively, the balance being attributable to “technical issues” including 
evasion. These estimates have been criticised for underestimating the extent of the gap and 
their publication has led to debates on both the actions of tax payers and concerns over the 
performance of HMRC (Financial Times, 2010). Tax planning is clearly a significant activity 
both in terms of fees and tax saving.      
 
This paper examines shareholders’ valuation of corporate income tax planning.2 In the 
absence of access to confidential tax return data we use the term tax planning to describe all 
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activities designed to produce a tax benefit.3 Although reducing tax can lead to higher after 
tax profits there are actual and potential costs that inhibit firms from maximising after tax 
profits through tax planning. In addition to direct paid costs in the form of salaries and fees, 
indirect paid costs can arise, for example, when corporate restructuring is a necessary 
condition for obtaining the desired tax benefit. Potential costs can exist to the extent that tax 
planning can be challenged by a tax administration which can also then lead to reputational 
costs. Empirical evidence from the US that suggests tax planning costs act as a significant 
constraint on corporate tax planning activity may explain what Weisbach (2002) describes as 
the “undersheltering puzzle” i.e. why firms do not appear to minimise tax liabilities. 
 
More recent US research has suggested further costs, in the form of agency costs, lead 
shareholders to discount the value of firms by reference to levels of tax planning activity 
(Desai & Dharmapala, 2006).  They argue the lack of transparency associated with tax 
planning provides managers with a “screen” or cover to hide self serving actions (Desai et al., 
2006). A survey by Henderson Global Investors (2005) found a reluctance on the part of 
managers to disclose tax related  risk management information to shareholders. This lack of 
awareness on the part of shareholders can lead to information asymmetry between managers 
and shareholders facilitating moral hazard. A related concern of shareholders is that managers 
who are “aggressive” with respect to tax planning may also be “aggressive” in their financial 
reporting decisions (Frank, Lynch & Rego, 2009). Against this setting it is also relevant to 
consider the role of corporate governance mechanisms in moderating any relationship 
between tax planning and firm value (Desai et al., 2006).      
 
Shareholder concerns may also be driven by general attitudes towards tax planning. Since the 
mid 1990s there is strong evidence of changing attitudes. At the supranational level the 
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European Union (EU) and Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) have both acted to protect corporate tax revenues by initially focussing on 
combating “tax competition” between states (European Union, 1999; OECD, 1998). These 
initiatives were designed to limit the extent to which individual states could use tax policy to 
influence firms’ location decisions. Subsequently the EU and OECD’s focus moved to 
enhancing legal and administrative procedures to ensure consistent and effective 
administration of tax legislation. In particular, the European Union (2004) set out steps to 
improve the ease at which information on corporate tax payers can be passed between tax 
authorities and non-tax supervisory bodies. In its “Seoul Declaration” the OECD’s Forum on 
Tax Administration announced its intention to study the role of tax intermediaries in 
“unacceptable tax minimisation arrangements” (OECD, 2008). More recently the OECD 
(2009) has focused on the banking industry as both a supplier and user of “aggressive tax 
planning arrangements”. 
 
The UK’s HMRC has played a leading role in the above initiatives and this is reflected in 
recent changes within UK tax legislation and tax administration. The Permanent Secretary for 
Tax at HMRC, David Hartnett, describes 2004 as “a tumultuous year in the tax 
administration's efforts to counter tax avoidance” (Hartnett, 2009). In that year the HMRC’s 
Anti-Avoidance Group (AAG) was established to develop and deliver the HMRC’s anti-
avoidance activities (Tailby, 2009). Also in 2004 new legislation (The Disclosure of Tax 
Avoidance Schemes) was enacted to provide HMRC with early information on the marketing 
of “aggressive” tax planning arrangements (HMRC, 2006).4 A change of approach has also 
been adopted in implementing existing legislation with the HMRC’s use of risk assessments 
to direct administrative effort to examining firms where the estimated level of corporate tax 
risk is highest (Freedman, Loomer & Vella, 2007; HMRC, 2007).  
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Tax planning by firms is of wider public interest since it can affect the level of provision of 
public goods which can then contribute to social issues (Slemrod, 2004). Non-Governmental 
Groups in the UK such as Oxfam (2009), Christian Aid (2009) and Trade Union Congress 
(2009) have all examined the issue from a social justice perspective. A similar line was taken 
by The Guardian (2009) in a series of  newspaper articles. 
 
The measure of “tax planning” used in this paper is initially defined as the difference between 
a firm’s current tax provision as disclosed in its annual financial statements and the (notional) 
level of tax that would be payable if its profit before tax was subject to tax at the UK 
statutory rate. We accept this is an imperfect measure of the outcome of tax planning 
activities for a number of reasons. Firstly, the measure would fail to detect tax planning that 
results in income not being subject to tax whilst also being excluded from accounting income. 
As discussed below strong incentives act against this scenario. Secondly, the measure 
includes non-discretionary differences between accounting and tax definitions of income 
which do not necessarily represent tax planning. These include for example, timing effects 
arising from differences between accounting depreciation and capital allowance rates or 
permanent effects arising when capital expenditure does not qualify for capital allowances. In 
subsequent analysis the sensitivity of the paper’s conclusions to these limitations is assessed.  
 
The paper’s contribution is four fold. Firstly against a backdrop of increased attention on 
firms’ tax planning activities it provides the first evidence concerning shareholder valuation 
of UK firms’ tax planning and provides insights into corporate behaviour and the resulting 
response of shareholders. The extant literature is US based and does not necessarily translate 
to the UK setting because of differences in tax law and approaches to compliance and 
enforcement. Secondly by using recently available tax reconciliation data required under IAS 
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12 Income Taxes (IASB, 2010), this paper uses disaggregated tax related data to test for 
differential effects of varying types of tax planning. Previous studies have generally relied on 
a lower level of disaggregation e.g. Desai and Dharmapala (2009). Thirdly although the 
potential moderating influence of corporate governance on the relationship between tax 
planning and share value has been examined in earlier studies, factor analysis is used to 
generate proxy variables that capture broad over reaching corporate governance structures. 
This avoids a subjective choice of proxy variables. Fourthly the analysis is conduced over a 
three year period thereby recognising that the composition of tax planning activities and 
attitudes to tax planning may vary over time. 
 
In summary we find evidence of a negative relationship between the level of tax planning and 
firm value. When its components are analysed separately, the source of the negative 
relationship appears to be permanent differences between taxable income and accounting 
profit measures. Both these findings are consistent with the Desai et al. (2006) agency view 
of tax planning. Unlike US studies though there is no compelling evidence of the negative 
relationship being moderated by corporate governance procedures.  
 
The next section of the paper reviews the relevant literature and is followed by sections on 
research design, sample and data source, results, further analysis and finally the conclusion. 
 
2. Tax planning activities, corporate governance and shareholders’ valuation 
 
Whilst there is a relatively long tradition of research in documenting and explaining 
variations in tax burdens or Effective Tax Rates (ETRs) in terms of firm level characteristics 
e.g. Zimmerman (1983), Gupta and Newberry (1997) and Holland (1998), only recently has 
attention  turned to understanding the underlying motivation for these variations and any 
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potential equity valuation consequences. Traditionally, tax planning is seen as leading to 
increased after tax earnings and therefore to be in the interest of shareholders; this is the view 
typically taken in valuation models. In recognising shareholders’ need to control managers’ 
tax decision making, Slemrod (2004) suggests linking managers’ compensation to “desirable 
outcomes” such as ETR. This implied valuation effect is consistent with anecdotal evidence 
of a negative association between ETR and share price (Swenson 1999). 
 
Studies of tax related valuation effects have considered whether in making valuation 
assessments shareholders differentiate between different categories of tax planning in terms 
of expected benefits and costs including risk. These studies typically use deferred tax 
disclosures in firms’ annual statements to disaggregate tax planning activities. IAS 12 Income 
Taxes (IASB, 2010) requires firms to provide a breakdown of their tax charge distinguishing 
between current and deferred taxes. A deferred tax charge (credit) is required when an item of 
income or expense included in the current income statement is included in the taxable income 
calculation of another period i.e. a “timing difference” (IASB, 2010). For example, 
differences in the rates of accounting depreciation and capital (investment) allowances with 
respect to qualifying capital expenditure.5 Consequently, the tax charge in the income 
statement includes both the current and future (deferred) tax consequences of the current 
period’s activities.6 In contrast, income or expenses which are only ever included in either the 
current income statement or the current taxable income calculation give rise to what are 
commonly referred to as “permanent differences”. 
 
Consequently planning benefits can be classified as either permanent or timing although in 
practice the distinction between the two can be blurred where timing differences are 
continually replaced. US evidence of the nature of tax planning suggests that “tax shelter” 
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activity is directed at permanent savings (Wilson, 2009). In contrast, although deferral or 
timing differences have no impact on the overall tax expense in the income statement a cash 
flow timing benefit can arise (Maydew & Shackelford, 2007). 
 
In examining valuation effects of timing and permanent differences it is necessary to control 
for earnings management as it can give rise to similar differences (Phillips, Pincus & Rego, 
2003; Hanlon, 2005). Further, in attributing differences to tax planning activity, it is 
necessary to isolate non-discretionary items e.g. tax depreciation, which although potentially 
having a valuation effect, do not necessarily represent tax planning activity (Frank et al., 
2009).   
 
In the literature on potential tax related valuation effects two specific sources of differences 
have been examined. Amir and Sougiannis (1999) and Atwood and Reynolds (2008) find that 
current period utilisation of prior period tax losses is value relevant. Similarly where a firm 
operates across a number of jurisdictions with varying statutory rates, tax rate differentials 
can provide a tax saving recognised in firm value (Bauman & Shaw, 2008). The valuation of 
the tax rate differential is dependent on the perceived earnings repatriation policy and the 
relative stabilities of the tax jurisdictions involved, i.e. whether the effect represents a timing 
or de facto permanent difference.  
 
In contrast, some studies find no direct association between measures of firm value and tax 
planning related measures. This absence has been attributed to the effect of unquantifiable 
non-tax costs (Cloyd, Mills & Weaver, 2003).7 In particular Desai et al. (2006) predict that in 
an agency setting tax planning can lead to a reduction in firm value when managers have both 
the opportunity to understate reported accounting profit and the incentive to reduce corporate 
  
10 
income tax liability by understating taxable income. If the two forms of understating are 
complementary, the general lack of transparency associated with tax planning provides 
“cover” for managers to extract rents at the expense of shareholders by understating 
accounting profit. Further, the effect of this complementary relationship is conditional upon 
the corporate governance mechanisms in place. Desai et al. (2006) predict that tax planning 
will be valued negatively by shareholders where weak corporate governance would permit 
associated understatement of accounting profit. When corporate governance provision is 
strong, accounting profit understatement is not possible and therefore tax planning provides 
no diversionary benefit. Desai et al. (2009) provide empirical evidence which gives some 
support for the prediction that corporate governance moderates the relationship between tax 
planning and firm value. This finding is consistent with the conclusion that tax planning is 
interpreted to have been conducted for the benefit of shareholders only when the level of 
corporate governance is strong. In other cases shareholders appear to be suspicious of 
managers’ motives and do not value tax planning positively. Similarly, Wilson (2009) and 
Hanlon and Slemrod (2009) document evidence that shareholders’ valuation of tax planning 
activity is conditional upon corporate governance status. A related valuation effect 
contributing further to shareholders’ potential concerns is that “aggressiveness” in tax 
planning can be associated with accounting “aggressiveness” (Frank et al., 2009). Within the 
same accounting period firms attempt to manage accounting profit upwards while 
simultaneously managing taxable income downwards.  
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3. Research design 
Measurement of tax planning 
As shareholders do not generally have access to firms’ tax returns and details of their 
planning activities it is necessary to use proxies based on publicly available information 
(Stewart, 1981). In addition to the requirement to provide for deferred taxation IAS 12 Income 
Taxes (IASB, 2010) requires firms to publish a reconciliation between the actual tax expense 
and the notional expense arising if liability was based on the current accounting profit before 
tax, i.e. without the adjustments normally required under tax law to convert accounting profit 
to taxable income. We measure the extent of tax planning as the after tax (net) effect of any 
difference between accounting profit and taxable income i.e. the sum of permanent 
differences (PD) and timing differences (TD).8 As discussed previously this measures 
captures both the effects of tax avoidance and any tax evasion. Hence we use the more 
general term “tax planning” (TP) to describe the measured effect. In addition to permanent 
and timing differences, variation between the notional and actual tax expense can arise when 
a firm faces varying statutory rates because of taxable income arising in more than one tax 
jurisdiction. Using published ETR reconciliations this statutory rate differential (STRDIF) 
can be separately identified. 
 
The variable TP is defined in equation 1 below and as shown is equivalent to the difference, 
in profit terms, between a firm’s statutory tax rate and its ETR.9 This ETR measure is 
consistent with that used in prior studies which have examined equity considerations, for 
example Zimmerman, 1983; Porcano, 1986; Holland, 1998; Mills, Erickson and Maydew, 
1998; Rego, 2003; Dyreng, Hanlon and & Maydew, 2008.  
 
( ) 





−=++=
PBT
CTESTRPBTSTRDIFTDPDSTRTP ukuk **    (1) 
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Where: TP = tax planning measure, STRuk = UK statutory main corporation tax rate, CTE = 
current tax expense, PBT = profit before tax, PD = permanent differences between 
accounting profit and taxable income measures, TD = timing differences between accounting 
profit and taxable income measures and STRDIF = tax effect of differences between UK and 
non UK statutory corporate income rates. The value of STRDIF is disclosed in published 
ETR reconciliations and can be defined as in equation 2: 
 
STRDIF = (STRuk – STRos)*TPos        (2) 
 
Where: STRos = weighted (by taxable income) average overseas statutory corporate income 
tax rate and TPos = taxable income subject to overseas tax. 
 
A potential limitation of the tax planning variable is that it fails to detect tax savings that do 
not generate either a timing difference, permanent difference or result in a reduced statutory 
tax rate applying, as captured by the variables, TD, PD and STRDIF respectively. This could 
arise where income is legally or illegally excluded from the income statement. Academic 
evidence suggests that such exclusion is unlikely to be significant; the need to report 
sufficient level of accounting profit in order to satisfy capital market expectations is a 
significant constraint on tax planning strategies (Hanlon, 2003).  
 
The tax planning variable (TP) is designed to capture the aggregate effect of tax planning 
activity. As discussed above its individual components may have varying valuation effects. 
Using the IAS 12 Income Taxes (IASB, 2010) reconciliations subsequent analysis classifies 
reconciling items into four categories comprising: permanent differences (TPD), timing 
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differences excluding loss relief (TTD), loss relief (TLOSS) and where the description of a 
reconciling item was insufficient to make a classification on the above basis, unclassified 
(TUNC). The reconciliations also disclose the effect of differences in statutory tax rates 
(STRDIF). These disclosures allowed for the disaggregation of the PD and TD terms in the 
tax planning variable TP in equation (1) into these further components as follows in equation 
3: 
 PD + TD = TPD + TTD + TLOSS + TUNC       (3) 
 
Measurement of corporate governance 
In preference to using selective individual factors to capture broad corporate governance 
mechanisms factor analysis is used to systematically identify proxies of underlying corporate 
governance constructs. To ensure the relevance of the selection process the full range of 
variables was selected from two recent studies of UK corporate governance practice by 
Florackis (2008) and McKnight and Weir (2009). The mechanisms considered represent 
ownership structure, board structure and compensation structure, see table 1. 
 
XXX Insert Table 1 about here XXX 
 
Ownership structure focuses on managerial and institutional ownership as potential 
mechanisms to reduce agency conflict. However, previous studies of managerial ownership 
document both a positive effect through goal congruence (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and 
negative effect, at high levels of ownership, through entrenchment (Florackis, 2008). 
Similarly, although institutional shareholders can provide an informed monitoring function, 
UK institutional shareholders are generally found to be passive (Goergen & Renneboog, 
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2001). Further, high levels of institutional ownership might allow a dominant institution to 
pursue its own objectives at the expense of other shareholders (Hart, 1995).  
 
Board structure defined in terms of the proportion of non-executive directors to total 
directors, board size and duality of chair and chief executive can be a significant factor in 
influencing shareholder - manager relationships (Florackis, 2008).10 Non-executive directors 
have been found to be effective in mitigating agency problems due to the constructive effects 
of directors’ independence, professional knowledge and experience (Zahra & Pearce, 1989). 
Board size has been found to influence corporate governance effectiveness in both positive 
and negative ways. Positively, large size can be associated with an increased range of skills 
and experience, greater opportunities in securing resources and more effective restriction of 
CEO domination. However, large size can also be associated with increased complications in 
coordination, communication and decision-making processes (Florackis, 2008). Individual 
directors holding multiply directorships have been found to provide increased effectiveness in 
terms of access to social networks, knowledge spillovers from multiple backgrounds and 
higher commitment of directors (Conyon & Muldoon, 2006; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006).   
 
Finally, compensation structure is considered. This mechanism, either by way of granting 
share options or providing performance-related pay, is designed to align managers’ interests 
with those of shareholders (Florackis, 2008).  However, the effectiveness of remuneration in 
reducing agency related problems can be challenged (Firth, Tam & Tang, 1999). Following 
Florackis (2008), this paper considers variables based on the level of executive salary and a 
dummy variable to capture the presence of options or performance related bonuses.  
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Before applying factor analysis, an initial assessment of the characteristics of the underlying 
data was performed. This comprised three steps: analysis of the pearson correlation matrix of 
the corporate governance variables, examining its determinate and measuring sample 
adequacy using the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkins test (KMO) and Bartlett’s test of sphericity (Pett, 
Lackey & Sullivan, 2003). These test statistics are reported in table 2 (panel A). The 
insignificant determinate and Bartlett test values combined with an overall KMO test value of 
0.6115 support the use of factor analysis.11 Finally, as all but two of the correlation 
coefficients are significant at the 5% level and all of the KMO statistics are in excess of 0.5 
(see table 2, panel B) it is concluded that factor analysis can be applied to the data set.  
 
XXX Insert Table 2 about here XXX 
 
The factor analysis indicate two underlying factors with eigenvalues > 1, and a cumulative 
variance explanation of 0.5111, as shown in table 2 (panel C).12 As the factor analysis is 
conducted with the intention to derive general corporate governance variables, a surrogate 
variable is required (Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson & Tatham, 2006). Thus, all of the items 
are further analysed to determine surrogate variables for each of the two factors. Based on the 
highest factor loadings the results indicate the proportion of non-executive directors on the 
board of company (NED) and percentage of shares held by substantial institutional 
shareholders (IOWN) as surrogates of factor 1 and 2 respectively in capturing firms’ general 
corporate governance structures.  Consequently, these two variables are included in the 
subsequent empirical analysis. 
 
Regression models 
The empirical analysis in this paper is based on a standard valuation model used in the 
accounting literature, for example, O’Hanlon and Taylor (2007) and Horton (2008). The 
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model explains equity valuation as a function of book value (BV) and current earnings (PBT) 
and a series of control variables. Market (firm) value of equity (MVE) is measured three 
months after the accounting year-end to reflect the lag in disclosing annual financial 
statements  to shareholders (O'Hanlon & Taylor, 2007; Horton, 2008).13  
 
The control variables mainly relate to information asymmetry and agency costs, for example, 
annual dividends (DIV) (Rees, 1997) and capital contribution (CC) (Akbar & Stark, 2003). In 
line with valuation relevance and taxation literatures, this paper also controls for several firm-
specific characteristics, these consist of capital intensity (CAPINT) (Mills et al., 1998; Frank 
et al., 2009), industry type (INDDUM) (Derashid & Zhang, 2003; O'Hanlon et al., 2007),  
leverage (LEV) (Mills et al., 1998), foreign sales (FS) (Rego, 2003; Bauman et al., 2008) and 
earnings management (EM) (Healy, 1985; Phillips et al., 2003; Hanlon, 2005).  
 
In explicitly controlling for observable tax related proxies of tax planning activities e.g. 
CAPINT, LEV and FS, the tax planning variable TP captures tax planning in other undefined 
areas which, because of their relative lack of transparency when compared to capital structure 
for example, may be valued differently by shareholders (Chen, Chen, Cheng & Shevlin, 
2010). A subsequent version of the model is run without the inclusion of these three control 
variables. The initial model (I) incorporating the tax planning and related control variables is 
set out below with variables as defined in table 3: 
 
it
n
itnititit
ititititititit
INDDUMFSDIVLEV
CAPINTEMCCTPPBTBVEMVE
εββββ
βββββββ
+++++
++++++=
∑
=
+
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 (model 1) 
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To assess the potential effect of corporate governance factors on the valuation of tax planning 
the above model is extended by including the two corporate governance related variables 
NED and IOWN to give model II as follows: 
 
MVEit+3 = β0 + β1BVEit + β2PBTit + β3TPit + β4NEDit + β5IOWNit + β6CCit + β7EMit 
+ β8CAPINTit + β9LEVit + β10DIVit + β11FSit + 
18
12=
Σ
n
βnINDDUM it + εit  (model II) 
 
A third model (III) tests whether the relationship between firm value and tax planning is 
moderated by the strength of firms’ corporate governance structures. Accordingly, model III 
is extended by the inclusion of two moderating variables, TP*NED and TP*IOWN 
constructed by multiplying a firm’s tax planning variable by NED and IOWN variables 
respectively.  
 
MVEit+3 = β0 + β1BVEit + β2PBTit + β3TPit + β4NEDit + β5IOWNit + β6TPit*NEDit + 
β7TPit*IOWNit +β8CCit + β9EMit + β10CAPINTit + β11LEVit + β12DIVit + β13FSit + 
20
14=
Σ
n
βnINDDUMit + εit        (model III) 
 
In each of the above models the aggregate tax planning variable TP has been employed. To 
test whether shareholder valuations of tax planning are conditional on the nature of the tax 
planning, in model IV the variable TP is replaced by its individual components TLOSS, TPD, 
TTD, STRDIF and TUNC as follows: 
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MVEit+3 = β0 + β1BVEit + β2PBTit + β3TLOSSSit + β4TPDit + β5TTDit +β6 STRDIFit 
+ β7TUNCit + β8NEDit + β9IOWNit + β10CCit + β11EMit + β12CAPINTit + β13LEVit +  
β14DIVit + β15FSit + 
22
16=
Σ
n
βnINDDUM it  + εit     (model IV) 
 
XXX Insert Table 3 about here XXX 
 
Each of the four models is deflated to control for any scale effects (Stark & Thomas, 1998; 
Akbar & Stark, 2003). In the absence of a theoretical justification on how to control for such 
effects a number of alternate deflators are used; opening book value of equity, opening 
market value of equity, number of shares and sales  (Rees, 1997; Liu & Stark, 2009). In line 
with existing literature our main results are based on the opening book value of equity 
deflator. The models were estimated using the Stata econometric software. The reported 
results are based on a random-effects estimation, subsequent sensitivity analysis reports 
results based on a fixed effects estimation to capture firm specific characteristics.  
 
4. Sample and data 
The paper employs a panel dataset of firms listed on the London Stock Exchange during the 
three year period 2005-2007 restricted to non-financial firms because of the limitations of 
using accounting based valuation models on financial firms. As the nature of tax planning 
activities may depend on firms’ expectations about future levels of profitability, with 
consistently profitable firms having a stronger incentive for tax planning (Mills et al., 1998), 
the sample is limited to firms that were profitable in all three years of the sample frame.14 
Further filters were used to exclude firms with negative book value, necessary as this variable 
is used as a deflator, negative tax charge, insufficient data and extreme ETRs. Table 4 
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presents the sample selection process which resulted in 196 firms to give a balanced panel of 
588 year end observations over the three year period. 
 
The dataset comprised tax data extracted from firms’ annual reports with the remaining 
financial statement related data obtained from Thompson Financial Datastream. Corporate 
governance data was obtained from Hemscott database with supplemental data collected from 
annual reports and The Corporate Register (various years). 
 
XXX Insert Table 4 about here XXX 
 
Descriptive statistics 
 
When estimating the above models influential and outlying observations were excluded to 
provide a more representative analysis.15 Table 5 contains descriptive statistics relating to the 
resulting sample of 444 firm year end observations used in estimating models I, II and III and 
the sample of 405 year end observations used to estimate model IV. Based on table 5 the 
mean value of TP indicates a mean tax saving of £7.465M for the sample of 444 firm year 
ends and a corresponding figure of £7.377M for the smaller sample of 405 firm year ends. 
The relative magnitude of the tax planning components can be seen in table 5. Expressed as a 
percentage of mean profit before tax the individual components in order of declining 
magnitude are: TTD (1.32%), STRDIF (0.59%), TUNC (0.53%), TLOSS (0.40%) and TPD 
(-0.19%). For each of the five components there are both positive (tax saving) and negative 
(tax increasing) values which highlights the dynamic nature of tax planning. The relatively 
high value of TUNC raises questions about the sufficiency of some firms’ tax related 
disclosures. 
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The corporate governance related characteristics of the sample can be summarised as follows: 
the mean board size (BSIZE) is eight directors with a slight majority (57%) being non-
executive directors (NED). Consistent with the observation that non-executive directors 
provide networking related benefits the percentage of directors that have multiple 
directorship (MDIR) is almost half (49%). Directors’ equity ownership (DOWN) is typically 
7% while the level of institutional ownership (IOWN) is higher at 34%.  The mean basic 
salary compensation (SAL) per board for executive directors in total is £987,577. These 
values are similar to those reported in a recent UK corporate governance study (Florackis, 
2008) with the exception of  DOWN which was higher at 15%.    
 
XXX Insert Tables 5 about here XXX 
 
5. Results 
The results of the four models are reported in table 6. In addition to the influential and outlier 
analysis previously described, further diagnostic tests were performed. The level of 
multicollinearity was assessed using condition indices (Belsley, Kuh & Welsch, 1980). These 
indicated the levels were acceptable.16 Due to repeated sampling of firms that have common 
features e.g. year end, panel data in accounting research can exhibit serious cross-sectional 
(“clustering”) dependence (Bernard, 1987; Petersen, 2009). Consequently the reported 
standard errors are estimated using Eicker-Huber-White robust standard errors which also 
control for heteroscedasticity (Petersen, 2009).  
 
XXX Insert Table 6 about here XXX 
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Models I, II and III are reported in columns I, II, III of table 6. The first two models show a 
significant negative relationship between firm value and tax planning which is robust to 
controlling for corporate governance mechanisms in model II.17 This result is consistent with 
shareholder concerns about moral hazard risk in tax or other tax planning-related risks, for 
example, the risk related to inspection or investigation by tax authorities. The negative 
significant coefficient with respect to IOWN is consistent with the Goergen et al. (2001) 
finding on the passive and ineffective monitoring role played by UK institutional investors. 
The control variables where significant are of the expected negative sign in the cases of EM 
and CAPINT. The variable FS is positive suggesting that an increasing proportion of non UK 
sales is associated with higher firm value.  Though this result could be explained by 
differences in relative tax rates it could also arise because of differences in relative 
profitability. In model IV we explicitly test for the effect of foreign tax rate differentials.   
 
Model III incorporates the two moderating variables TP*NED and TP*IOWN to examine 
whether the relationship between firm value and tax planning is conditional upon the strength 
of corporate governance structures. The previously negative significant relationship between 
firm value and tax planning no longer holds, and although now positive, TP is not 
significantly different from zero. Caution should be exercised in interpreting this as evidence 
of a corporate governance effect. A comparison of the adjusted R2 for model III (64.70%) 
with that of model II (64.34%) is consistent with the moderating corporate governance 
variables TP*NED and TP*IOWN contributing little in terms of additional explanatory 
power.18  As an additional test of the influence of corporate governance the sample was split 
into sub-samples of “high” and “low” corporate governance effectiveness (Desai et al., 2006). 
Firms were assigned a sub-sample by reference to the median value of the product of NED 
and IOWN on the basis that both higher institutional ownership and proportion of non-
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executive directors could contribute to better corporate governance  (Zahra et al., 1989; 
Florackis, 2008). The results are reported in the next two columns of table 6 for “high” and 
“low” governance firms respectively. Both estimations report a significant negative 
relationship between firm value and TP; the TP coefficients in the two sub samples do not 
significantly differ from each other.19 In contrast to Desai et al. (2009), these results suggest 
corporate governance does not mitigate the negative relationship between TP and firm value 
even in the case of “high” governance firms.20  
 
The next set of results examines whether the relationship between TP and firm value varies 
by its components (model IV). There is a significant negative relationship between firm value 
and TPD. Despite controlling for earnings management through the variable EM, it is 
possible that the variable TPD reflects both tax planning and earnings management 
(aggressive accounting). However, a comparison of the EM coefficient between models II 
and IV which exclude and include the variable TPD respectively shows an insignificant 
difference consistent with TPD reflecting tax effects.21 The remaining tax planning 
components TLOSS, TTD, STRDIF and TUNC are statistically insignificant.22 Although the 
variable FS which measures the proportion of firm sales that are made outside of the UK is 
consistently positive and statistically significant, the foreign tax rate differential variable 
STRDIF is consistently insignificant, though positive. This suggests the influence of FS is 
derived from pre tax profitability and not tax benefits.  
 
6. Further analysis 
 
This section reports further analysis to assess the robustness of the above results. The analysis 
relates to the date of measuring firm value, choice of deflator, firm fixed-effects, potential 
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non-linear association between firm value and tax planning, alternative measures of firm 
value and the exclusion of the potential tax planning related control variables. To provide a 
fuller picture of the association between firm value and tax planning, annual regressions are 
also carried out. 
 
Qualitatively identical results to those reported above in models I, II and III are found when 
deflating either by opening market value of equity or sales. However, when deflating by 
number of shares no significant relationship is found between tax planning and firm value. 
When examining the individual components using model IV deflated by the number of shares 
TPD is no longer significant while STRDIF become significant and positive. When opening 
market value is used as the deflator, none of the components in model IV are reported as 
significantly related to firm value. When deflated by sales the only significant component is 
TTD which becomes positive. Caution must therefore be exercised in attributing the source of 
the overall negative relationship between firm value and tax planning to individual 
components because of the sensitivity of model IV’s results.  
 
The results reported in table 6 are estimated using a random effects model which assumes any 
uncontrolled heterogeneity in firm specific factors are not correlated with the included 
independent variables. We relax this assumption through the use of a fixed effects model. 
These results are qualitatively no different from those in table 6. We conclude that the 
negative relationship between firm value and TP does not appear to be proxying for omitted 
firm specific characteristics, such as earnings management.   
 
High levels of tax planning may only be achievable at unacceptable levels of risk or 
“aggressiveness”. Consequently the negative association between firm value and TP may 
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increase non-linearly at “higher” levels of tax planning (Hanlon et al., 2009). Models I and II 
were re-estimated with the inclusion of quadratic tax planning variable TPNL defined as 
TP*TP. The inclusion of this variable did not change the previously reported results and did 
not significantly increase the models explanatory power consistent with a linear relationship.  
 
Tobin’s Q has been used in some studies e.g. Desai et al. (2009) as an alternate dependent 
variable to market value of equity.23 Regressing Tobin’s Q onto the independent variables in 
models I, II and III produce qualitatively identical coefficient estimates to the results in table 
6. When using Tobin’s Q to examine the individual components in Model IV, in contrast to 
the significant negative relationship reported in table 6 for TPD, no statistically significant 
coefficient arises with respect to TPD or any of the other tax component variables. 
 
The inclusion of the control variables CAPINT, LEV and FS which are designed to capture 
observable tax planning related activities result in the variable TP capturing the remaining or 
unobservable tax planning activities (Chen et al., 2010). Omitting these three variables from 
the models would result in the variable TP capturing a wider range of tax planning activities 
both observable and unobservable. To the extent that observable activities pose lower risks to 
shareholders in terms of moral hazard etc, the TP coefficient should increase after excluding 
the three control variables with similar effects for the individual components in model IV.  
However, these revised models show qualitatively identical results to those reported in table 
6., in particular there are no significant differences with respect to the TP variable or its 
components.24  This implies the negative TP coefficient and those of the individual tax 
components are not solely driven by unobservable tax planning related factors but that 
shareholder concerns relate to both observable and unobservable tax planning factors. 
 
  
25 
Attitudes to tax planning have changed over time as discussed above. To explore the 
possibility that the negative relationship between firm value and tax planning may vary over 
time two further tests were conducted. Firstly models I, II and III were reestimated with the 
inclusion of year dummies, this process has no effect on the qualitative interpretation of the 
reported results. Secondly annual regressions for each of the three years were estimated. The 
results for 2005 and 2006 are consistent with the above results, while for 2007 a statistically 
insignificant coefficient is reported for TP.25  
 
The variation in annual results suggests changes over time in either the nature of tax planning 
or shareholders’ attitudes to tax planning, or a combination of both effects. Given the 
restrictions of using publicly available data relating to tax planning it is difficult to assess the 
extent to which the first factor is valid. However, an investigation of the individual 
components by year does reveal variation in their relative importance. Figure 1 plots by year 
the mean value of each component relative to TP. Of particular note is the reversal between 
2005 and 2006 of the relative importance of TPD and TTD and the marked variation in the 
remaining terms with the exception of TLOSS. This adds strength to the need to consider 
several years of data when drawing conclusions on tax planning effects because of possible 
linkages between years. Though there is considerable variation across the years there is no 
obvious indication of why 2007 differs from the earlier two years.   
 
XXX Insert Figure 1 about here XXX 
7. Conclusions 
 
Our overall conclusion is that tax planning is not valued by shareholders and is in fact value 
reducing. A consistent negative relationship between tax planning and firm value arises 
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which is generally robust to a number of different specifications and controls. On average the 
results are consistent with an agency cost theory of tax planning where the information 
asymmetry generally associated with tax planning can result in moral hazard or fear of moral 
hazard. There is some evidence that suggests the source of the negative relationship to be 
permanent differences, where income is included in accounting profit but falls outside the 
definition of taxable income. Arguably this type of activity although carrying the highest 
potential tax benefits also potentially generates the highest level of risk and cost.  
 
This overall result is consistent with some of the prior exclusively US based research. 
However, in contrast to US findings of Desai et al., (2009) and Wilson (2009), corporate 
governance mechanisms do not appear to moderate the agency costs associated with tax 
planning.  Two possible explanations exist, firstly UK corporate governance mechanisms are 
ineffective per se, or secondly, there is insufficient tax related information made available for 
a potential control mechanism to operate and this deficiency is noted by shareholders. These 
differences suggest researchers should pay attention to tax related institutional and policy 
differences that exist between countries when interpreting existing research. 
 
In considering the results it is again worth emphasising that the tax planning measure uses 
only publicly available information which although identical to the position shareholders are 
in may result in misstatement. If shareholders are to be effective monitors and controllers of 
firms’ tax related decision, financial reporting and tax regulatory bodies should consider 
requiring increased tax related disclosures by firms. However, shareholders face a dilemma if 
in demanding increased tax related disclosure managers are discouraged from pursuing 
“legitimate” tax planning activities. To the extent that increased disclosure reduces 
“illegitimate” activity shareholders and tax administrators would benefit. A critical step in 
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determining the extent and form of additional disclosures is agreeing the boundary between 
“legitimate” and “illegitimate” tax planning. 
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Notes: 
1
 HMRC (2010) defines technical issues as “uncertainty about the correct tax treatment, 
through mistakes to culpable errors in, or omissions from, the company tax return”. This 
definition would therefore include the effects of tax evasion. 
2
 All subsequent references to tax are to corporate income tax unless otherwise stated. 
3
 Using only publicly available information replicates the position facing shareholders and 
therefore distinctions between (legal) tax avoidance and (illegal) tax evasion and 
intermediary concepts such as “acceptable tax avoidance” and “aggressive tax planning” 
cannot be made. In recognition of this we use the term tax planning to describe the observed 
effects though, as subsequently discussed, we would expect tax avoidance to be the main 
form of tax planning.  Earlier studies that use the term tax avoidance make an implicit 
assumption as to the legality of the underlying tax planning processes. However, when 
referring to official reports we use the terminology adopted in the report for the sake of 
consistency. 
4
 More recently the Government has established a “study programme” to establish the 
feasibility of introducing a “General Anti-Avoidance Rule” (GAAR) into UK domestic 
legislation (HM Treasury, 2010). 
5
 Other sources of timing differences include such items as product warranty costs, retirement 
benefit costs and research costs which can be deducted from accounting profits on an accrual 
basis but are only deductible for tax purposes when paid in a subsequent period (IASB, 
2010). The deferred tax charge can also be affected by a timing difference in relation to 
unused tax losses (IASB, 2010). 
6
 In addition to timing differences recognised in the income statement IAS 12 also requires 
recognition of temporary differences arising from differences between an asset or liability’s 
(revalued) carrying value for accounting purposes and its tax base. Such temporary 
differences are recognised outside the income statement and therefore the measure of tax 
planning in this paper is free of tax related revaluation effects. 
7
 The measurement problem presented by non-tax costs when attempting to identify tax 
effects has been highlighted by Shackelford and Shevlin (2001) and Chen, Chen, Cheng and 
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8
 In contrast an alternative measure of tax planning, the “book-tax gap”, captures the gross 
effect of the differences between accounting profit and taxable income. The use of a net or 
ETR based measure as used in this study has the advantage  that it can avoid measurement 
errors in the process of grossing up foreign tax expenses in order to arrive at the level of 
(gross) taxable income (Hanlon, 2003). 
9
 Where the ETR expresses the current income tax expense (CTE) relative to the accounting 
profit before tax (PBT). Using the notation in the following paragraph CTE is defined as: 
CTE = STR*(PBT – PD –TD). 
10
 In the sample used in this paper 98% of the observations have separate Chair and CEOs. 
Therefore the issue of duality is not considered further. 
11
 The KMO test value is in excess of the acceptable threashold level of 0.5 (Hair et al., 2006). 
12
 The loadings are based on an orthogonal varimax rotation method in which the factors are 
assumed to be independent of each other. However, analysis based on an alternative rotation, 
i.e. promax rotation, is also conducted and the results are qualitatively similar to the loadings 
of varimax rotation.  
13
 The subsequently reported results are robust to measuring the market value of equity six 
months after the year-end. This alternative measurement of market value allows a longer 
period for information in the annual financial report to be reflected in the share price (Rees, 
1997; Stark & Thomas, 1998; O'Hanlon & Pope, 1999).  
14
 This restriction resulted in the exclusion of 22 non-persistent firms. This number is 
insufficient to conduct tests within this subset of firms. 
15
 The basis for excluding influential observations is the DFIT measure, its critical value is: 
abs (DFIT)>2*(P/N)½  where P and N are the number of variables and observations 
respectively (Belsley et al., 1980). Outlying observations were defined with a studentized 
residual >|2| (Chen, Ender, Mitchell & Wells, 2005). In models I, II and III, 87 year end 
observations were excluded as either influential or outlying respectively. In order to maintain 
a balanced panel by necessity a further 57 year end observations were excluded.    In model 
IV the number of firm year ends excluded was 99 and 84 respectively.   
16
 None of the condition indices exceed the critical value of 30 (Belsley et al., 1980). 
Similarly bivariate correlation analysis shows an acceptable level of correlation. The largest 
(absolute) coefficient +0.28 (between PBT and TP) significant at the 1% level, is below the 
critical value of 0.9 (Hair et al., 2006) which indicates insignificant multicollinearity.   
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17
 Any potential endogeneity of TP is assessed by re-estimated model I using a 2SLS 
regression with an instrumental variable (IV) (Larcker & Rusticus, 2007). Based on the 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test for endogeneity the test rejects the endogeneity of TP χ2 = 14.92 
(p = 0.5304).  The lag variable TP is considered an appropriate IV due to the short-run nature 
of a tax planning activities (Dyreng et al., 2008). 
18
 Although formal tests do not indicate excessive multicollinearity, see endnote 16. 
19
 Result of test of significance is as follows: Ho -8.0161 = -8.8816 not rejected χ2 =0.03 
(p=0.8578). 
20
 Interestingly though it does appear to moderate the relationship between earnings 
management and firm value.  
21
 Result of test of significance is as follows: Ho -2.7992 = -2.5750 not rejected χ2 = 0.23 
(p=0.6347). As the sample size varies between models II and IV a more stringent test is to 
estimate model II using model IV sample size and then compare values of EM coefficient. 
This process results in the following: Ho -2.7456 = -2.5750 not rejected χ2 = 0.11 (p= 
0.7398). 
22
 A simple test of differences between the five tax component coefficient estimates indicate 
that TPD is significantly different from each of the other four coefficients (TLOSS, TTD, 
STRDIF and TUNC) and in turn these four do not differ from each other. 
23
 Tobin’s Q is computed by deflating, the amount of book value of assets plus market value 
of common stock minus book value of common stock minus deferred tax expense, by book 
value of assets. As it is now included in the dependent variable the book value of equity is 
then removed as an independent variable.  
24
 Results of tests of significance between the TP coefficient (or tax component variables as 
in model IV) in each set of models i.e. with and without the control variables CAPINT, LEV 
and FS, are summarised as follows: Model I TP (including controls) = -9.1967, TP (excluding 
controls) = -9.5025, χ2  = 0.01 (p = 0.9230). Model II TP (including controls) = -9.5925, TP 
(excluding controls) = -10.4004, χ2  = 0.07 (p = 0.7987). Model III TP (including controls) = 
2.9235, TP (excluding controls) = 3.5267, χ2  = 0.00 (p = 0.9516). Model IV TLOSS, TPD, 
TTD, STRDIF, TUNC (including controls) -1.7713, -12.3547, 7.0694, 5.6768 and -5.8766 
respectively; (excluding controls) -1.3063, -12.4622, 7.7668, 2.5688 and -5.7410 
respectively, χ2 = 0.01 (p = 0.9353), χ2 = 0.00 (p = 0.9864) and χ2 = 0.02 (p = 0.8847) 
respectively. 
  
31 
                                                                                                                                                        
25
 In the interests of economy these results are not tabulated but are available from the authors 
upon request. 
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Table 1: Corporate Governance Measures 
Mechanism Variable Measure 
Ownership 
structure 
Director ownership (DOWN) Percentage of shares held by directors 
 Institutional ownership (IOWN) Percentage of shares held by substantial 
institutional shareholders 
Board 
structure 
Board size (BSIZE) Number of directors serving the board 
 Non-executive directors (NED)  Percentage of non-executive directors to 
total number of directors on the board 
 Multi-directorship  (MDIR) Percentage of directors who serve more 
than one board to total number of 
directors  
Compensation 
structure 
Executive salary (SAL) Total salary paid to executive directors 
(scaled by beginning book value of 
equity) 
 Option or bonus (BODUM) Dummy measure of option or bonus, 1 if 
option or bonus has been paid, 0 
otherwise 
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Table 2: Factor analysis - Corporate Governance  
Panel A: Matrix Characteristics 
Overall KMO test statistic: 0.6115 
Bartlett’s test of sphericity: χ2 = 607.680*** 
Matrix determinate: 0.3530  
***  indicates significance at 1% level. 
Panel B: Pearson Correlation Matrix and Kaiser-Meyer-Olkins statistics 
n=588 DOWN IOWN BSIZE NED MDIR SAL BODUM 
DOWN 0.611       
IOWN -0.275*** 0.522      
BSIZE -0.044 -0.146*** 0.654     
NED -0.204*** 0.127*** 0.154*** 0.593    
MDIR -0.295** 0.038 0.196*** 0.609*** 0.597   
SAL 0.1519*** 0.009 -0.184*** -0.368*** -0.250*** 0.719  
BODUM -0.330*** 0.146*** -0.071* 0.1658*** 0.119*** -0.112*** 0.6405 
Individual Kaiser-Meyer-Olkins statistics  are in italics on the diagonal 
Correlation coefficients on off-diagonal. 
Panel C: Rotated Factor Loadings 
Items Factor 1 Factor 2 
DOWN -0.344 -0.6507# 
IOWN -0.039 0.698# 
BSIZE 0.505# -0.424 
NED 0.794# 0.166 
MDIR 0.785# 0.126 
SAL -0.631# 0.026 
BODUM 0.168 0.631# 
# Indicates extracted items for each factor. 
***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 2.5% and 5% levels respectively. 
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Table 3: Variables 
Variable Description (expected sign) Measurement 
MVE+3months Market value of equity Market value of equity 
BVE Book value of equity (+) Book value of equity 
PBT Profit before tax (+) Profit before tax 
TP Tax planning (±) (STR-ETR)*PBT
 
TLOSS Tax losses (±) Tax loss related  reconciling items 
TPD Permanent differences (±) Permanent difference reconciling items 
TTD Timing differences (±) Timing difference reconciling items 
STRDIF Statutory rate differential (±) UK/overseas tax differential reconciling items 
TUNC Unclassified items (±) Unclassified reconciling items 
CC Capital contribution (+) Net proceed from sales or issues of common and 
preferred shares 
EM Earnings management (-) Profit before tax – Cash flow from operating 
activities 
CAPINT Capital intensity (±) Gross machinery and equipment/Total assets 
LEV Leverage (+) Long term debt/Total assets 
DIV Dividend (+) Dividends Per Share/Earnings Per Share*100 
FS Foreign sale (±) Percentage of foreign sales over total net sales 
NED
 
Corporate governance I (+) Proportion of non-executive directors on the board 
of company 
IOWN Corporate governance II (+) Percentage Institutional ownership 
INDDUM Industry dummy (±) Coded 1 for each particular industry classification, 0 
otherwise 
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Table 4: Sample Selection Process 
Details Number of 
Observations 
Number of 
Companies 
Public listed companies (listed throughout the period)  1006 
Finance companies  (580) 
Not available in Datastream  (32) 
At least one year of annual report is not available  (59) 
Accounting period of more than 12 months  (4) 
Insufficient effective tax rate reconciliation data  (29) 
Negative book value of equity  (24) 
“Zero” sales  (1) 
Extreme value of effective tax rates (ETR>1)  (19) 
 774 258 
Negative profit before tax (76)  
Negative tax charge (22)  
Unbalance data (88)  
 
Initial sample 588 
 
196 
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Table 5: Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean 
n=444 
Min Max Standard 
deviation 
Mean 
n=405 
Min Max Standard 
deviation 
MVE
-3 (£m) 2,149.390  6.650 40,034.070 5,533.618 2,268.608 6.650 40,034.070 5,773.970 
BVE (£m) 712.354  8.756  13,700.000  1,546.922 753.063 8.756 13,700.000 1,610.579 
PBT (£m) 181.467   0.434  5,146.555  507.634 192.998 0.434 5,146.555 529.590 
TP (£m)   7.465  -237.300  331.700  36.837 7.377 -237.300 331.700 38.407 
ETR  0.271  0.000  0.927  0.126 0.278 0.000 0.927 0.127 
CC (£m) 12.197 -140.000 805.000 57.190 12.248 -140.000 805.000 57.810 
EM (£m) 1.584 -1,333.000 1,133.631 148.190 4.329 -13,333.000 1,133.631 153.652 
MVE+3/BVEt-1   3.402  0.590  18.950  2.171 3.175 0.590 1.913 18.950 
BVEt/BVEt-1  1.152  0.213  7.058  0.377 1.132 0.213 2.553 0.246 
PBTt/BVEt-1  0.264  0.014  1.430  0.165 0.258 0.014 1.430 0.154 
TPt/BVEt-1  0.009  -0.105  0.165  0.027 0.007 -0.178 0.134 0.028 
CCt/BVEt-1 0.038 -0.322 2.416 0.165 0.034 -0.322 1.224 0.125 
EMt/BVEt-1 -0.012 -0.653 0.567 0.168 -0.003 -0.580 0.567 0.154 
DIV 0.037 0 0.976 0.226 0.377 0.000 0.976 0.232 
CAPINT 0.209 0.001 1.475 0.270 0.213 0.001 1.475 0.278 
LEV  0.155 0.001 0.644 0.155 0.149 0.001 0.644 0.140 
FS (%) 37.864 0 112.913 33.940 37.824 0 112.913 33.797 
BSIZE
 
 8.312  4 16  2.249 8.346 4 16.000 2.188 
NED  56.759  0 88.889  13.174 56.706 0 88.889 13.527 
DOWN
 
  6.642  0 60.451  13.176 6.741 0 60.451 13.427 
IOWN  33.540  0 92.400  17.618 32.985 0 77.940 17.120 
MDIR
 
 49.103  0 100.000  23.729 48.659 0 100.000 23.577 
SAL (£m)  0.988  0.086  4.303  0.605 0.977 0.086 3.894 0.537 
SALt/BVEt-1  0.008  0.001  0.061  0.010 0.008 0.001 0.061 0.009 
TLOSS (£m)     0.773 -28.000 140.000 9.035 
TPD (£m)     -0.361 -135.000 211.524 18.490 
TTD (£m)     2.539 -22.000 151.000 12.040 
STRDIF (£m)     1.143 -28.526 141.728 10.915 
TUNC (£m)     1.019 -32.375 72.000 6.218 
TLOSSt/BVEt-1      0.000 -0.066 0.040 0.009 
TPDt/BVEt-1     -0.003 -0.098 0.047 0.013 
TTDt/BVEt-1     0.004 -0.052 0.076 0.012 
STRDIF
 t/BVEt-     0.000 -0.048 0.028 0.008 
TUNCt/BVEt-1     0.001 -0.063 0.051 0.007 
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Table 6: Regression estimations –Models I, II, III and IV  
Dependent 
variable: 
MVEt+3months 
Model I Model II Model III Model 1 
“High” governance 
Model 1 
“Low” governance 
Model IV 
BE
 
1.0814 
4.53*** 
1.1167 
4.68*** 
1.1286 
4.83*** 
1.2592 
3.88*** 
0.6055 
1.47 
0.7167 
2.55*** 
PBT
 
10.0106 
17.00*** 
10.0020 
16.79*** 
10.0312 
16.87*** 
9.8773 
16.12*** 
10.7235 
10.92*** 
9.5480 
14.14*** 
TP
 
-9.1967 
-2.91*** 
-9.5925 
-3.03*** 
2.9235 
0.30 
-8.0161 
-1.76* 
-8.8816 
-2.03**  
TLOSS      -1.7713 
-0.31 
TPD      -12.3547 
-1.96** 
TTD      7.0694 
1.47 
STRDIF      5.6768 
0.69 
TUNC    
  
-5.8766 
-0.54 
NED  0.0080 
1.48 
0.0096 
1.74*   
0.0075 
1.44 
IOWN  -0.0074 
-1.89* 
-0.0070 
-1.66*   
-0.0083 
-2.10* 
TP*NED   -0.1681 
-1.07   
 
TP*IOWN   -0.0817 
-0.56   
 
CC 0.1831 
0.38 
0.1048 
0.22 
0.0731 
0.16 
-0.0238 
-0.03 
0.4513 
0.89 
0.3319 
0.71 
EM -2.8076 
-6.42*** 
-2.7992 
-6.31*** 
-2.7651 
-6.19*** 
-0.9329 
-5.15*** 
-2.9649 
-4.88*** 
-2.5750 
-5.46*** 
CAPINT
 
-0.5308 
-2.96*** 
-0.5163 
-2.96*** 
-0.5175 
-2.95*** 
-0.3598 
-1.69* 
-0.7671 
-2.22* 
-0.4714 
-2.44*** 
LEV
 
-0.2923 
-0.65 
-0.4862 
-1.09 
-0.4577 
-1.01 
0.0247 
0.04 
-1.0018 
-1.62 
-0.2551 
-0.61 
DIV -0.0003 
-0.14 
-0.0002 
-0.13 
-0.0003 
-0.17 
-0.0006 
-0.22 
-0.0007 
-0.23 
0.0026 
1.51 
FS 0.0061 
3.01*** 
0.0058 
2.84*** 
0.0057 
2.78*** 
0.0017 
0.62 
0.0096 
3.48*** 
0.0059 
2.96*** 
Cons -0.1615 
-0.45 
-0.3715 
-0.81 
-0.4879 
-1.05 
-0.0878 
-0.19 
0.2259 
0.36 
-0.1855 
-0.41 
R-squared  63.39% 64.34% 64.70% 61.17% 71.66% 58.84% 
N 444 444 444 222 222 405 
Wald 563.77 (16) *** 562.08 (18) *** 509.13 (20) *** 838.15 (16) *** 465.98 (16) *** 363.70 (22) *** 
Breusch-Pagan 82.98 (16) *** 83.95 (18) *** 84.70 (20) *** 34.63 (16) *** 55.13 (16) *** 77.60 (22) *** 
1. Figures in italics represent cross-section clustered Eicker-Huber-White adjusted t-statistics. 2. ***, ** and * indicate 
significance at 1%, 2.5% and 10% respectively (single or two tailed respectively). 3. Industry dummy coefficients not reported 
in interests of economy. 
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Fig 1: Tax planning component by year 
 relative to mean profit before tax 
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